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JACK BALKIN’S INTERACTION 
THEORY OF “COMMERCE” 
Randy E. Barnett* 
In his book, Living Originalism, Jack Balkin proposes what he 
calls the “interaction theory” of the original semantic meaning of the 
word “commerce” in the commerce clause.  He claims that “com-
merce” meant “social interaction.”  In this Article, I explain why his 
theory is wrong due to errors of commission and omission.  Balkin is 
wrong to reduce “commerce” to “intercourse,” “intercourse” to “in-
teraction,” and “interaction” to “affecting.”  This triple reduction dis-
torts rather than illuminates the original meaning of “commerce.”  
Balkin furthermore omits from his discussion the massive amounts of 
evidence of contemporary usage—along with dictionary definitions of 
“intercourse”—establishing that “commerce” referred to the trade or 
transportation of things or persons, and did not include such produc-
tive economic activity as manufacturing or agriculture, much less all 
social interaction.  I also reply to Balkin’s criticisms of my book, Re-
storing the Lost Constitution.  In particular I explain why his heavy 
reliance on Gunning Bedford’s resolution in the secret Philadelphia 
convention is misplaced in a discussion of the original meaning of the 
commerce clause. 
 
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a 
constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or 
words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or 
less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.1 
 
It is my pleasure to participate in this symposium on Jack Balkin’s 
new book, Living Originalism.2  I will not mince words.  This book is a 
potential masterpiece.  It is a work of remarkable sophistication, maturi-
ty, and grace.  It is the culmination of years of scholarship but presents 
 
 *  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center.  This 
Article was prepared for the Symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism, held at the University of 
Illinois College of Law on April 8–9, 2011 in Champaign, Illinois.  I am particularly grateful to my col-
league Larry Solum for his comments on an earlier draft.  I also thank my research assistant Anastasia 
Killian for her excellent assistance.  Permission to copy for educational use is hereby granted. 
 1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 2. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
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Balkin’s previous insights in a whole that is greater than the sum of its 
previous parts.  And it is beautifully written. 
To appreciate where this book fits within the pantheon of constitu-
tional scholarship, it is important to note that this is a work of constitu-
tional theory.  The work of other great scholars of our time, such as 
Balkin’s colleagues Bruce Ackerman3 and Akhil Amar,4 while making 
enormous contributions to our understanding of constitutional history, 
can hardly be considered theoretical.  Or, perhaps more accurately, they 
assume rather than present and defend a constitutional theory of popular 
sovereignty.  The same is true of the recent work of Philip Hamburger,5 
Mark Graber,6 and Barry Friedman.7  Other constitutional scholars to-
day, such as Sanford Levinson,8 Dan Farber,9 David Strauss,10 and Kermit 
Roosevelt,11 while making some theoretical claims, have written books 
largely for a popular audience that can be considered engaging and pro-
vocative polemics.  Those readers who seek a rigorous defense of their 
more theoretical claims will be disappointed. 
Living Originalism is not primarily a work of constitutional history, 
though it does include some important historical claims.  Nor is it a po-
lemic, though it is movingly written and accessible to a wider audience 
than legal scholars.  Rather, it presents a comprehensive theory of consti-
tutional interpretation and construction grounded in an integrated theory 
of constitutional legitimacy and social change.  It is in the genre of 
Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire12 and, before that, John Ely’s path-
breaking Democracy and Distrust.13  It has been nearly twenty-five years 
since we have had such a book in constitutional theory, and its publica-
tion is an important event. 
Balkin presents a progressive case for original public meaning in-
terpretation.  Because he was long known as the preeminent defender of 
living constitutionalism, his relatively recent adoption of originalism has 
engendered consternation and skepticism among both his friends and in-
tellectual opponents.  Some progressives are concerned because one of 
 
 3. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).  
 4. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(1998). 
 5. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
 6. See, e.g., MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 
(2006). 
 7. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 8. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 9. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE (2007). 
 10. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2006). 
 12. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 13. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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their best and brightest seems to have joined the ranks of the enemy;14 
others doubt his good faith.15  Conservative originalists also doubt both 
his sincerity16 and the genuineness17 of his version of originalism.  Both 
sides are suspicious of his ability to reach progressive results with 
originalist methodology and are suspicious of what they perceive may be 
opportunism rather than a deep academic commitment. 
This book undercuts all these intimations.  It is a serious explication 
and defense of original public meaning originalism that both progressive 
nonoriginalists and conservative originalists alike must take seriously.  It 
poses a significant intellectual challenge to the existing theoretical com-
mitments of both sides, though there is much for both to appreciate here 
as well, if their minds are open. 
But Living Originalism does more than explain and defend 
originalism.  It also presents an extended theory of the practice of consti-
tutional construction and situates the activities of interpretation and con-
struction within a theory of democratic legitimacy.  And it integrates this 
normative defense of interpretive and constructive methods into Balkin’s 
theory of how constitutional practice evolves in response to social 
movements.  That is a whole lot. 
To repeat, this book represents the scholarly culmination of a 
lengthy career by one of the most creative, gifted, and personable schol-
ars of our generation.  But it is not without its weaknesses.  In this Arti-
cle, I examine one: Balkin’s “interaction theory” of the original meaning 
of “commerce” in the commerce clause.  In the interest of time and 
space, I confine myself solely to his interpretation of “commerce” and do 
not discuss other aspects of his treatment of the commerce clause and its 
application, with which I may also disagree. 
 
 14. My personal perception of academic reactions to Balkin’s adoption of originalism stems from 
numerous conversations with numerous constitutional law scholars.  Given the recency of this devel-
opment, however, citations are difficult to supply.  But, for what it is worth, see, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, 
The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 355 (2007) (“[M]y main 
thesis here is that Balkin should no longer be welcomed by the living constitutionalists, despite his 
claim to be meeting their fundamental needs.”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 353 (“It certainly seems like the originalists are winning.  Professor Jack 
Balkin—finding that he couldn’t beat ‘em—joined them.”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 355 (“[M]any originalists will read Balkin to be a living constitutionalist in 
disguise—and may not let him into their club, notwithstanding his bona fides as an adept historian of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 17. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles As the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 373 (2007) (“Professor Balkin’s normative defense [of 
originalism] proves insufficient, because he does not provide a persuasive reason why we should follow 
the original meaning of the Constitution, regardless of whether the Constitution or the process that led 
to its enactment were desirable.”). 
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I. BALKIN’S INTERACTION THEORY OF “COMMERCE” 
This Article begins with a quotation from Justice Black’s dissenting 
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.18  Those who know my work will rec-
ognize that I believe that Griswold was correctly decided, and that I also 
reject a cramped interpretation of constitutional rights.  Nevertheless, I 
find Justice Black’s dissenting admonition insightful.  Although he was 
speaking of rights and not powers, he was quite correct that one of the 
ways that interpreters can slip the bounds of meaning provided by the 
text of the Constitution “is to substitute for the crucial word or words of 
a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible 
and more or less restricted in meaning.”19   
In his discussion of the original meaning of the word “commerce” in 
the Constitution, Balkin makes this move not once but three times: the 
word “commerce” is replaced by “intercourse,” which is then replaced by 
“interaction.”  He then equates “interaction” with “affecting.”  That is a 
lot of reduction or translation, and the suspicion is that the semantic 
meaning is being altered in the process.  Although it is fair to define 
“commerce” as “intercourse,” it nevertheless invites distortion to simply 
substitute “intercourse” for “commerce” in the clause.  And I do not 
think the available evidence of original meaning supports the substitu-
tion of “interaction” for “intercourse.” 
Let me begin by summarizing Balkin’s reduction of “commerce.”  
Quite properly, he begins with Johnson’s dictionary definition.  “Samuel 
Johnson’s dictionary, roughly contemporaneous with the founding, de-
fines ‘commerce’ as ‘Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another, in-
terchange of anything; trade; traffick.’”20  Then, in an endnote, he repro-
duces examples from the first edition of Johnson’s dictionary in 1755: 
Places of publick resort being thus provided, our repair thither is 
especially for mutual conference, and, as it were, commerce to be 
had between God and us.  Hooker, [Ecclesiastical Polity,] 
b[ook].v.s., [Chapter] 17 [18]. 
How could communities,  
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities, 
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,  
But by degree stand in authentick place? Sh[akespeare],  
Troil[ius]. and Cress[ida]. 
Instructed ships shall sail to quick commerce,  
By which remotest regions are ally’d;  
Which makes one city of the universe,  
Where some may gain, and all may be supply’d.  
Dryden.   
 
 18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 20. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 149. 
BARNETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  10:46 AM 
No. 3] BALKIN’S INTERACTION THEORY OF “COMMERCE” 627 
These people had not any commerce with the other known parts of 
the world.  Tillotson 
In any country, that hath commerce with the rest of the world, it is 
almost impossible now to be without the use of silver coin.  Locke.21 
Balkin tells us that “[a]ll of these are examples of exchange, some 
social, some economic.  The primary example is not economic: Hooker’s 
‘places of publick resort’ are not inns but churches for public preaching, 
and presumably our commerce with God is communication and prayer, 
not the trade of commodities.”22  He then adds another example of usage 
from the fourth edition, printed in 1775, pertaining to “Johnson’s exam-
ple of the second definition of commerce, ‘common or familiar inter-
course’ . . . : ‘Good-nature, which consists of overlooking of faults is to be 
exercised only in doing ourselves justice in the ordinary commerce and 
occurrences of life.  Addison.’”23 
Balkin contends that, “[i]f we want to capture the original meaning 
of ‘commerce,’ we must stop thinking primarily in terms of commodities.  
We must focus on the ideas of interaction, exchange, sociability, and the 
movement of persons that business (in its older sense of being busy or 
engaged in affairs) exemplifies.”24  In support of this conclusion, he offers 
that the meaning of “commerce” is informed by its Latin cognate 
“commercium,” which, he says “came to refer to traditional academic 
feasts, where commercium songs were sung around the table.”25 
In light of Johnson’s definition of “commerce” as “intercourse,” 
Balkin naturally stresses the famous definition offered by Chief Justice 
Marshall in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden: “Commerce, undoubtedly, is traf-
fic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.  It describes the commer-
cial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”26   
Further, Balkin characterizes what he calls the “trade theory” of 
commerce as a nineteenth century invention.  “I will call the contrasting 
view held by Justice Thomas and others—that the original meaning of 
‘commerce’ is the trade or exchange of commodities—the ‘trade theo-
ry.’”27  Noting accurately that this meaning does “not include manufac-
turing, mining, or agriculture, much less any noneconomic activities,” 
Balkin claims that “[t]his reading is anachronistic; by focusing on the dis-
position of commodities, it reflects a modern conception of commerce 
viewed as a subset of economic activity; it completely misses the eigh-
teenth-century dimensions of commerce as a form of social intercourse 
 
 21. Id. at 379 n.36. 
 22. Id. at 379–80 n.36.  
 23. Id. at 380 n.36. 
 24. Id. at 151. 
 25. Id. at 380 n.42.  Balkin’s source for this claim is unclear from the endnote, but I have no 
doubt he has one. 
 26. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824). 
 27. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 151. 
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and exchange.”28  But, as we shall see, Balkin fails to wrestle with the 
plentiful examples of persons associated with the Constitution’s drafting 
and ratification, equating “commerce” with “trade,” and distinguishing 
this economic activity from that of agriculture and manufacturing.   
II. OMITTED EVIDENCE 
In this Part, I provide some of the evidence omitted from Balkin’s 
analysis of the original meaning of the term “commerce” in the Constitu-
tion.  
A. Dictionaries 
Several key pieces of evidence are omitted from Balkin’s account.  
Given that Johnson (and Marshall) define “commerce” as “intercourse,” 
it is helpful to know how Johnson defines “intercourse.”29  But let me 
first offer Johnson’s entire definition of “commerce” from the 1785 edi-
tion: “1. Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another; interchange of 
any thing; trade; traffick. . . . 2. Common or familiar intercourse.”30 
Without anything more, Johnson’s first definition of “commerce” 
seems to generally track what Balkin calls the “trade theory,” albeit 
broader, including the “interchange of any thing.”  “Things” are the fo-
cus of the first definition.  Johnson’s second distinct definition seems 
more like the “social interaction” meaning that Balkin is claiming, as in-
dicated by Johnson’s only example of usage: “Good-nature, which con-
sists in overlooking of faults, is to be exercised only in doing ourselves 
justice in the ordinary commerce and occurrences of life.  Addison.”31   
This suggests that “commerce” is ambiguous in that it has two dis-
tinct senses:32 one sense concerning the trade or interchange of things 
from one place to another, and another sense of social interaction.  If so, 
in discerning the original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution, 
one does not simply combine the one distinct meaning with the other, 
but asks which of the multiple meanings is the one that a reasonable 
reader would think was being conveyed in the relevant context, here in 
Article I, Section 8.   
For example, would a reasonable English speaker in 1789 think the 
power “[t]o regulate [c]ommerce”33 included the power to regulate “tra-
 
 28. Id. at 150. 
 29. In the draft of this paper presented at the symposium, I criticized Balkin for failing to include 
Johnson’s definition of “intercourse.”  In response, he has since added this definition to an endnote in 
the book.  See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 380 n.38. 
 30. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, 6th ed. 1785) 
(unpaginated). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953–56 
(1967) (explaining the difference between vagueness and ambiguity). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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ditional academic feasts, where commercium songs were sung around the 
table”34 or “communication and prayer” with God?35  If not, then John-
son’s secondary meaning is unlikely to be the reasonable meaning.  In-
stead, a reasonable speaker would more likely conclude that “com-
merce” referred to the first meaning of “exchange,” “trade,” “inter- 
change,” or “traffick.”36 
But what about “intercourse,” the very first synonym of “com-
merce” within Johnson’s first definition?  Here is how Johnson defined 
the term: “1. Commerce; exchange. . . . 2. Communication: followed by 
with.”37  This definition seems entirely consistent with the trade, traffic or 
interchange of things sense of “commerce.”  Indeed, so is the secondary 
meaning of “communication: followed by with.”  Communication is not 
limited to verbal acts—think of “communicable” diseases—but even ver-
bal communication consists of transmitting a message from one person or 
place to another.  Here is how Johnson defines “communication:” “1. 
The act of imparting benefits or knowledge. . . . 2. Common boundary or 
inlet; passage or means, by which from one place there is a way without 
interruption to another. . . . 3. Interchange of knowledge; good intelli-
gence between several persons. . . . 4. Conference; conversation.”38 
Like Balkin, we are now moving steadily away from the term 
“commerce,” to “intercourse” and “communication.”  But even as we do 
so, we continue to observe the movement of something from one place to 
another and, with verbal communication, that something is information.  
But the term “movement” is potentially misleading insofar as it includes 
people or things that are simply in motion.  Rather, all these terms refer 
to types of activity, of human action, or as Johnson puts it, “the act of 
imparting benefits or knowledge.”  It is not just that goods or infor-
mation happen to relocate themselves, like wind-borne particles.  Com-
merce, intercourse, and communication are all forms of the human activi-
ty of transmitting or carrying things from place to place, typically in 
exchange for something in return.  Communication, the saying goes, is a 
two-way street.  So, “transporting” or “transportation” is a more accu-
rate word than is “movement”. 
Which brings us to navigation.  According to Johnson, to “navigate” 
means “[t]o pass by ships or boats,” and “navigation” means “[t]he act or 
practice of passing by water.”39  Again, “passing” entails the activity of 
transporting something, in particular, a ship and its contents by water.   
As we shall see, the Founding generation believed that “commerce” 
was conducted by merchants40 so, to round out our definitions, we should 
 
 34. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 36. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 37. 1 JOHNSON, supra note 30. 
 38. Id. (emphasis added). 
 39. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 30. 
 40. See infra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text. 
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also see how Johnson defines that term.  A “merchant” was defined as 
“[o]ne who trafficks to remote countries.”41  The verb “to merchandise” 
is defined as “[t]o trade; to traffick; to exercise commerce.”42  And a 
“merchant-man” was “[a] ship of trade.”43 
Today, we tend to use the term “intercourse” most often to refer to 
sexual intercourse.  Balkin tells us that “sexual intercourse . . . is not the 
concept referred to by the commerce clause.”44  But why not?  He does 
not say.  Even today we do not use the term sexual intercourse to de-
scribe all sexual “interactions.”  Sexual intercourse, strictly speaking, in-
volves the act of conveying, communicating, or transmitting something 
from one person to another in a particular way.  If “commerce” meant 
“intercourse,” then on Balkin’s account sexual intercourse ought to be 
included in the original meaning of “commerce.”  True, it is wholly intra-
state, but so too is the cultivation of medical marijuana in one’s back-
yard.  In the aggregate, both types of local activities could be said to sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.  
Of course, Johnson’s was not the only dictionary available at the 
Founding.  As Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion in United 
States v. Lopez, other dictionaries provided comparable definitions.45  
Nathan Bailey’s 1775 dictionary defined “commerce” as: “Trade or 
Traffick” with a secondary meaning of “Converse, Correspondence.”46  
Thomas Sheridan’s 1796 dictionary defined “commerce” as “Exchange of 
one thing for another.”47  Unlike Johnson, neither Bailey nor Sheridan 
defined “commerce” as “intercourse,” suggesting that “intercourse” was 
not the first synonym that leapt to everyone’s mind.  Still, Bailey defined 
“intercourse” as “mutual Correspondence, Commerce, or Traffick,”48 
and Sheridan defined it exclusively as “Commerce; exchange.”49  With 
these and Johnson’s definitions in hand, Balkin’s failure to examine seri-
ously the contemporary meaning of “intercourse”50 begins to look like a 
significant omission.  
In his famous 1828 dictionary, Noah Webster defined commerce as 
“an interchange or mutual change of goods, wares, productions, or prop-
erty of any kind, between nations or individuals, either by barter, or by 
purchase and sale; trade; traffick.”51  Although this is well after the 
 
 41. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 150. 
 45. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585–86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 46. N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, 21st ed. 1775). 
 47. THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia, 
W. Young, Mills & Son 6th ed. 1796). 
 48. BAILEY, supra note 46. 
 49. SHERIDAN, supra note 47. 
 50. Beyond the belated addition of Johnson’s definition to an endnote.  See supra note 29. 
 51. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 42 (New 
York, S. Converse 1828). 
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Founding, it is close in time to Gibbons and well before the “modern” 
era in which Balkin claims this meaning first arose.52 
Also unmentioned by Balkin is the etymology of the word com-
merce.  As Justice Thomas noted, “[‘commerce’] literally means ‘with 
merchandise.’”53  He then cited the Oxford English Dictionary’s etymol-
ogy of “com—‘with’; merci—‘merchandise.’”54  From commerce, to mer-
chants, to merchandise, to trade is a much more natural sequence than is 
commerce, to intercourse, to interaction. 
So far as contemporary dictionaries are concerned, then, a clear pic-
ture emerges of the meaning of commerce at the time of the Founding: 
Commerce concerned the trade, traffic, and transportation of things from 
one place to another.  It somewhat metaphorically meant social ex-
change, but this was a secondary and distinct sense of the term.  Nor did 
the term “intercourse” convey much more or different information.  That 
the activity of passing or transporting things by water—or “navigation”—
is subsumed within the core meaning of “commerce” seems an easy con-
clusion to reach.  By contrast, these dictionaries provide no support for 
concluding that, as used in the Constitution, the term “commerce” was 
broad enough to include such interactions as “traditional academic 
feasts, where commercium songs were sung around the table,” or com-
municating with God.   
B. Evidence of Contemporary Usage 
In ascertaining the objective or public meaning of “commerce” in 
the Constitution, it is useful to examine uses of the word in that context.  
For this reason, in my article in The University of Chicago Law Review, I 
surveyed every use of the term in the Philadelphia convention, The Fed-
eralist, and the surviving reports of the state ratification debates.55  I 
found not one example of the word being used in any broader sense than 
that of trade, including the activity of transporting goods by water.   
Balkin does not deal with any of this evidence or even mention its 
existence.  I will not rehearse all my findings here, except to report some 
of the examples of where “commerce” is clearly distinguished from the 
economic activities of agriculture and manufacturing.  If “commerce” 
was typically used to embrace all forms of social interaction, including 
academic feasts and communications with the Deity, it would also have 
included farming and manufacturing.  Yet, it is clearly and repeatedly 
used in a different and narrower sense. 
 
 52. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 53. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. (citing 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 55. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
101 (2001). 
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At the Philadelphia convention, James Madison proposed to grant 
Congress the power “[t]o establish public institutions, rewards and im-
munities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manu-
factures,”56 strongly suggesting that the members understood the term 
“commerce” to mean trading or exchange, distinct from the productive 
processes that made the things to be traded. 
In several of his contributions to The Federalist, Alexander Hamil-
ton repeatedly distinguished between the activity of “commerce” and 
that of production.  In Federalist 12, he referred to the “rivalship,” now 
silenced, “between agriculture and commerce,”57 while in Federalist 17, 
he distinguished between the power to regulate such national matters as 
commerce and “the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a 
similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided 
for by local legislation.”58  
In Federalist 21, Hamilton maintained that causes of the wealth of 
nations were of “an infinite variety,” including “[s]ituation, soil, climate, 
the nature of the productions, the nature of the government, the genius 
of the citizens, the degree of information they possess, the state of com-
merce, of arts, of industry.”59  In Federalist 35, he asked, “Will not the 
merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be prop-
er, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturing arts to which his 
commerce is so nearly allied?”60  Hamilton’s understanding of the mean-
ing of commerce as trade persisted when he was Secretary of the Treas-
ury.  In his official opinion to President Washington advocating a broad 
congressional power to incorporate a national bank, he repeatedly re-
ferred to Congress’s power under the commerce clause as the power to 
regulate “the trade between the States.”61 
True, like many others, Hamilton thought that commerce between 
states and with foreign nations was a national concern, while agriculture 
and manufacturing were local.  For this reason, including the commerce 
power in Article I, Section 8 was consistent with the principle expressed 
in the Bedford Resolution so stressed by Balkin62 and discussed below.63  
But this does not entail that the word “commerce” was a proxy for “any 
activity (or ‘interaction’) that is of national concern.”  Commerce had a 
clear, defined meaning and—whatever vagueness might exist in its pen-
umbra—it was a different activity than that of production via farming or 
 
 56. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1987).  
The term “trades” connotes crafts and other types of trades, not trade or exchange. 
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12, at 91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 141 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 61. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Es-
tablish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 100 (Harold C. Syrett 
et al. eds., 1965); see also id. at 118 (referring to “the regulation of trade between the states”). 
 62. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 143–46. 
 63. See infra Part IV. 
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manufacturing.  And it was commerce and only commerce—although not 
even all commerce—over which Congress was given power. 
The use of the term “commerce” was invariant during state ratifica-
tion conventions.  Elsewhere I summarize each use of the term.64  Here I 
will confine myself to examples that clearly distinguish “commerce” from 
other economic activities.   
In Massachusetts, Thomas Dawes, a prominent revolutionary and 
legislator, complained about the absence of a federal taxing power, the 
adverse consequences of which “will be evident if we take a short view of 
our agriculture, commerce, and manufactures.”65  He then gave separate 
attention to each of these activities and the beneficial effect the Constitu-
tion would have on them.66  Under the heading of “commerce,” he re-
ferred to “our own domestic traffic that passes from state to state.”67  In 
Connecticut, Oliver Elsworth referred to the Swiss who “[t]ill lately,” he 
said, “had neither commerce nor manufactures.  They were merely a set 
of herdsmen.”68  
In New York, Governor Clinton referred to “[t]he situation of [each 
state’s] commerce, its agriculture, and the system of its resources.”69  An-
other delegate expressed skepticism about the need for a new Constitu-
tion because of recent economic improvement.  “How [the country’s] ag-
riculture, commerce, and manufactures have been extended and 
improved!”70   
But, in New York, it was Hamilton who made the most repeated 
and clearest use of the term “commerce.”  In one speech, he observed: 
“The Southern States possess certain staples,—tobacco, rice, indigo, 
&c.,—which must be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign 
nations . . . .”71  And he employed the same distinction in replying to the 
objection that the regulation of commerce was outside the competency of 
a central government: “What are the objects of the government?  Com-
merce, taxation, &c.  In order to comprehend the interests of commerce, 
is it necessary to know how wheat is raised, and in what proportion it is 
produced in one district and in another?  By no means.”72  Later, in de-
fending the power of direct taxation, Hamilton argued that, without such 
a power, “[o]ur neighbors, not possessed of our advantages for com-
merce and agriculture, will become manufacturers: their property will, in 
 
 64. See Barnett, supra note 55, at 116–25. 
 65. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 
1787, at 57 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES]. 
 66. Id. at 57–59. 
 67. Id. at 58. 
 68. Id. at 188. 
 69. Id. at 261. 
 70. Id. at 336. 
 71. Id. at 237. 
 72. Id. at 255. 
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a great measure, be vested in the commodities of their own productions; 
but a small proportion will be in trade or in lands.”73 
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson clearly distinguished farming and 
manufacturing from commerce, while extolling the importance of the lat-
ter to the former when he asked:  
Suppose we reject this system of government; what will be the con-
sequence?  Let the farmer say, he whose produce remains unasked 
for; nor can he find a single market for its consumption, though his 
fields are blessed with luxuriant abundance.  Let the manufacturer, 
and let the mechanic, say; they can feel, and tell their feelings.  Go 
along the wharves of Philadelphia, and observe the melancholy si-
lence that reigns. . . . Let the merchants tell you what is our com-
merce . . . .74 
In North Carolina, William Davie defined “[t]he general objects of 
the union” to be “1st, to protect us against foreign invasion; 2d, to defend 
us against internal commotions and insurrections; 3d, to promote the 
commerce, agriculture, and manufactures, of America.”75  Later, he ex-
plained why the regulation of commerce, though distinct from agriculture 
and manufacturing, promoted them: “Commerce, sir, is the nurse of 
both.  The merchant furnishes the planter with such articles as he cannot 
manufacture himself, and finds him a market for his produce.  Agricul-
ture cannot flourish if commerce languishes; they are mutually depen-
dent on each other.”76  And, Davie also distinguished between “the inter-
est of agriculture and commerce” and explained how the Constitution 
would protect just claims of “the merchant or farmer.”77 
In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney distinguished those “people 
[who] are employed in cultivating their own lands” from “the rest [who 
are] in handicraft and commerce.”78  He then immediately expanded up-
on this by discussing the different “classe[s]” of society comprised of the 
“[c]ommercial men,” the “professional men,” those engaged in “the me-
chanical,” and the “landed interest—the owners and cultivators of the 
soil.”79 
In Virginia, I counted at least seventeen references that link “com-
merce” in some way to ports, shipping, navigation, or the “carrying 
trades.”  For example, Richard Henry Lee asked those who doubted the 
need for the Constitution to “go to our seaports; let him see our com-
merce languishing—not an American bottom to be seen.”80  Edmund 
Randolph urged members to “[c]ast your eyes to your seaports; see how 
 
 73. Id. at 369. 
 74. Id. at 524. 
 75. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 65, at 17. 
 76. Id. at 20. 
 77. Id. at 159. 
 78. Id. at 321. 
 79. Id. at 321–22. 
 80. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 65, at 43. 
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commerce languishes.”81  He observed that “Virginia is in a very unhappy 
position with respect to the access of foes by sea, though happily situated 
for commerce,”82 and that “[a]s it is the spirit of commercial nations to 
engross as much as possible the carrying trade, this makes it necessary to 
defend our commerce.”83  Like Lee and Randolph, Francis Corbin asked 
his listeners to visit the empty ports, where “he will behold but a few tri-
fling little boats; he will every where see commerce languish; the discon-
solate merchant, with his arms folded, ruminating, in despair, on the 
wretched ruins of his fortune, and deploring the impossibility of retriev-
ing it.”84 
Future Chief Justice John Marshall asked whether “the 
Algerines . . . and every other predatory or maritime nation, [cannot] pil-
lage our ships and destroy our commerce, without subjecting themselves 
to any inconvenience?”85  Madison asserted that “American vessels, if 
they can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the con-
tending nations.”86  William Grayson stated that the riches of all those 
“maritime powers of Europe . . . come by sea.  Commerce and navigation 
are the principal sources of their wealth.”87  And, echoing Marshall, 
James Innes asked, “Is it not in the power of any maritime power to seize 
our vessels, and destroy our commerce, with impunity?”88 
But uses of “commerce” in Virginia were not limited to navigation.  
Edmund Pendleton, for instance, viewed “commerce” as the means by 
which “the people may have an opportunity of disposing of their crops at 
market, and of procuring such supplies as they may be in want of.”89  So 
synonymous was “commerce” with “trade” that William Grayson wor-
ried that “the whole commerce of the United States may be exclusively 
carried on by merchants residing within the seat of government.”90  He 
could not have been including agriculture or manufacturing in his defini-
tion of commerce.  Nor could he possibly have thought that the term 
“commerce” equated with social interaction, such that all social interac-
tion could possibly be conducted in the future District of Columbia. 
To avoid cherry picking, in writing my University of Chicago Law 
Review article, I comprehensively surveyed every use of the term “com-
merce” in the Philadelphia convention, The Federalist, and the surviving 
records of the ratification conventions.91  I did not expect usage to be uni-
form, but hoped rather to be able to distinguish normal usage from that 
 
 81. Id. at 66. 
 82. Id. at 72. 
 83. Id. at 78. 
 84. Id. at 105. 
 85. Id. at 235. 
 86. Id. at 249. 
 87. Id. at 428. 
 88. Id. at 635. 
 89. Id. at 295. 
 90. Id. at 291. 
 91. See Barnett, supra note 55. 
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which was aberrational.92  Hence, my surprise at finding that usage was 
consistently narrow where the context supplied meaning.  In no case did 
I find an unambiguous use that connoted all social interaction.93 
Balkin dismisses all this in a single sentence, and without revealing 
to his readers the fullness of these examples: “[C]onstitutional debates 
tend to focus on the key concerns that divide people at the time and not 
on the many possible applications of constitutional language.”94  No, this 
is not what the evidence shows if one reads it.  These statements show 
what the word “commerce” was assumed to mean—including by mem-
bers of the ratification conventions which were deemed to represent the 
public.  Of course, commerce was a “key concern,” which explains why 
the commerce clause was included in the text.  But it was a concern about 
commerce, the activity described by the term “commerce,” as used in the 
commerce clause.   
Balkin also seems to deny the accuracy of evidence presented above 
when he says, “Even if the framers used the term “commerce” in its nar-
rowest possible sense (which they did not . . . ), the public meaning of the 
word to a general audience was much wider, and surely it is the general 
publicly understood meaning of the words used that should count.”95  
Part of this depends on what is meant by “narrowest possible sense.”  My 
evidence shows that “commerce” was routinely used to include “naviga-
tion.”96  Is this the narrowest possible sense?  At any rate, I found not a 
single example in these three sources in which “commerce” was used in 
the broader sense of “social intercourse.” 
Apart from some illustrations from dictionaries, however, Balkin 
provides scant evidence of how the public actually used the word “com-
merce.”  In contrast, to discern how the public used the term “com-
merce,” two research assistants and I conducted a study that goes un-
mentioned in Living Originalism.97  I asked my assistants to examine, 
independently of me and of each other, every use of the term “com-
merce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette that appeared from 1728 to 1800.98  
The Pennsylvania Gazette, which, from 1729 to 1766, was published by 
Benjamin Franklin,99 “[i]n its essential character, although not in its unu-
sual longevity, . . . was representative of the great majority of the news-
 
 92. See id. at 111–12. 
 93. See id. at 112. 
 94. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 153. 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
 97. Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. 
L. REV. 847, 856–65 (2003).  My assistants were Stacy Cline and Adam Budesheim, who were then 
both students at Harvard Law School, where I was a visiting professor at the time.  Once again, I ex-
tend my appreciation to them for the work they did on this study. 
 98. Id. at 856–57 (detailing the methodology of this study).  We used the database provided by 
Accessible Archives.  ACCESSIBLE ARCHIVES, http://www.accessible.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).  
Each entry on the database has a unique item number, which is included in my citations.  
 99. See  Charles E. Clark & Charles Wetherell, The Measure of Maturity: The Pennsylvania Ga-
zette, 1728–1765, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 279, 281, 291 (1989). 
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papers of the provincial period.”100  Were the term “commerce” to have 
had a readily understood broad meaning, one would expect it to have 
made its appearance in this typical newspaper whose publication 
spanned the colonial and postcolonial period.  And if the term “com-
merce” was ambiguous, one could detect which of the multiple meanings 
of “commerce” was most common. 
From 1728 to 1800, the term “commerce” appeared 1594 times.   
Rather than sample these uses, each assistant, separately from the other, 
examined every appearance of the word to see whether it was being used 
in the sense employed in the sources I had previously surveyed.  In par-
ticular, I asked them to flag for my review any uses that even arguably 
represented a broader meaning.  I also asked them to code the uses in a 
number of other ways, for example, whether the term is used in a couplet 
with “trade” or refers to shipping.  What they found was dramatic, 
though it is impossible here to convey the overwhelming consistency of 
the usage of “commerce” to refer to trading activity (especially shipping 
and foreign trade) without listing one example after another. 
The earliest use of the term appeared in 1728, and referred to 
“commerce” as “the Affairs of Merchandize.”101  One of the latest in 1798 
refers to a 1765 caricature in which the messenger god Mercury was used 
to signify commerce.  A 1787 entry defines the term explicitly: “[B]y 
commerce I mean the exports as well as the imports of a country . . . .”102  
A 1773 entry notes the existence of “the Royal College of Physicians, 
and the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and 
Commerce.”103 
Of the 1594 examples examined, just three suggested a possible 
broader meaning, though the content of whatever broader meaning they 
might convey is obscure.  In 1786, the following appeared: 
Never were there a people on earth who possessed greater ad-
vantages than those of the United States.  Never was there a path 
more plain, or means more simple, fully sufficient to establish our 
prosperity and happiness, than those which present themselves to 
us.  Heaven, by the advantages put in our power, does almost com-
pel us to be a happy people: While we seem to turn our backs on 
our advantages, seek the dark side of the cloud, and magnify our 
difficulties.—Establish but public faith and credit, and public confi-
dence will follow, for they are concomitants of each other.—The 
salutary effects will be immediately diffused and felt among the 
people; a chearful air will be displayed in every countenance; trade, 
 
 100. Id. at 280. 
 101. Advertisement, PA. GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 1728, available at Accessible Archives, Item No. 1. 
 102. Common Sense, Addressed to the Opposers of the Bank, PA. GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1787, availa-
ble at Accessible Archives, Item No. 73696. 
 103. Bowen’s Sago, PA. GAZETTE, Dec. 29, 1773, available at Accessible Archives, Item No. 
54627. 
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commerce and agriculture will flourish: While our republic becomes 
respectable, both at home and abroad.104 
This passage suggests that trade and commerce are distinct.  Nor does 
this appear to be an example of the couplet “trade and commerce” that 
made its appearance repeatedly in the Gazette as it had in the materials 
surrounding ratification that I earlier surveyed.  
Taken literally, “commerce” here appears to be distinct from both 
“agriculture” and “trade” as it is again in the following passage from 
1782: “Yet while the war was carried on by the mass of general opposi-
tion, the business of the country got deranged.  Agriculture, trade and 
commerce became neglected, and something like poverty began to ap-
pear.”105  Similar, but somewhat less suggestive, is the following from 
1762: 
And whereas such pernicious Practices may not only give Opportu-
nities to evil disposed Persons to cheat and defraud the honest In-
habitants of this Province, but prove introductive of Vice, Idleness 
and Immorality, injurious to Trade, Commerce and Industry, and 
against the Common Good, Welfare and Peace of this Prov-
ince . . . .106 
In each of these phrases, the word “trade” precedes the word 
“commerce” as though the writer was echoing the couplet “trade and 
commerce,” while adding “agriculture” or “industry” to it.  Indeed, in the 
1782 passage, the phrase actually used is “trade and commerce.”  To the 
extent, however, that by “commerce” these writers really meant some-
thing different than trade, it is not at all clear what activities they had in 
mind.  Yet even these three exceptional uses are inconsistent with a 
broader meaning of “commerce” as embracing all social interactions. 
Why might the general public have been particularly concerned 
about the subset of social interactions involving commerce?  To give the 
flavor of this, consider this lengthy paean to the virtues of commerce by a 
writer calling himself “Leonidas,” as part of his plea for its protection by 
a powerful American Navy: 
When the benefits of Commerce and the blessings of Liberty were 
set in competition with each other, it was the duty of every man to 
sacrifice the former to the latter.  The only commerce that was in 
our power in the beginning of the war was the commerce of Great-
Britain, and this entailed slavery upon us.  No wonder therefore we 
spurned at it.  The untanned skins and unmanufactured furs of our 
native wild beasts, with freedom, were splendid robes, compared 
with slavery cloathed in the silks, &c. of Great-Britain.  But the dec-
 
 104. Charlestown (Massachusetts) June 30, PA. GAZETTE, July 19, 1786, available at Accessible 
Archives, Item No. 73008. 
 105. Common Sense, To the People of America, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 1782, available at Accessi-
ble Archives, Item No. 67182.  Though this could be the couplet “trade and commerce.” 
 106. An Act for the More Effectual Suppressing and Preventing of Lotteries, PA. GAZETTE, Mar. 4, 
1762, available at Accessible Archives, Item No. 28196. 
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laration of independence has produced a revolution in the duties of 
an American.  He has nothing now to fear from commerce!  He is 
no longer restrained by arbitrary acts of navigation!  He is no longer 
confined to one market.  The whole world (Britain excepted) is 
open to the productions and demands of his country.  Commerce 
has become therefore not only inoffensive, but useful; nay more, it 
has become absolutely necessary to the happiness of America. 
Humanity revolts at the review of those times, when the inhab-
itants of the different countries in Europe were unconnected with 
each other by the ties of commerce.  It served the same purposes, 
with respect to States, that the different occupations of men serve in 
the same community.  By becoming necessary to each other, they 
promoted universal peace and benevolence.  It was Commerce that 
taught the soldier to spare the industrious husbandman in war, and 
to feel an horror at shedding innocent blood.  In a word—it was 
commerce that revived the belief and enforced the precepts of 
Christian religion, by teaching mankind that they were children of 
the same father, and members of one great family. 
America requires more from commerce than any country in 
the world . . . . 
America, disjointed from the civilized parts of the globe by an 
immense bed of waters, can maintain an intercourse with them only 
by means of commerce.  It is this which must bring us all the im-
provements in arts and science of countries, where men are main-
tained in societies for the sole purpose of adding by their discover-
ies to the pleasures and conveniences of life. 
Republics are the havens of commerce.  Carthage, Holland, 
Venice and Genoa, have each in their turns been the carriers of Eu-
rope.  It is essential to commerce that property be secure, and re-
publics afford more security to property than any other form of 
government.  The republics of America have every thing to hope 
from commerce that is friendly to liberty.  It forms the only barrier 
that can be contrived to check the aristocratic tendency of a mo-
nopoly of land.  It is in countries where commerce is unknown, that 
the peasant trembles at the sight of the hereditary landholder.  
Commerce, by opposing ships to farms, and substantial wealth to 
family pride, brings the ancient citizen to a level with the man of 
yesterday.  It opens the door to power, rank and influence to every 
body.  It is the magnet of talents and the cherisher of virtue.  It is 
calculated to restore men to their original equality, and to expel 
tyranny from the world.  It is impossible to be too sanguine as to 
the duration of freedom in America, while we continue a commer-
cial people.  In the extensive distribution and fluctuation of wealth, 
and in the variety of competitions and new combinations of inter-
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ests and families, produced by commerce, monarchy and aristocracy 
can never raise their heads in America.107 
For Leonidas and his audience, commerce is clearly a distinctive 
form of activity, and distinct especially from land ownership, though he is 
also a big fan of property.  And he refers to “commerce” as a means of 
maintaining “intercourse” with “the civilized parts of the globe.”  Do 
“countries where commerce is unknown” lack all social interactions?  
Does his opposition of “ships to farms” suggest that both activities are 
species of “commerce” as understood by the general public?  Because 
Balkin ignores this and the other one hundred typical examples of the 
use of “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette I included in my Univer-
sity of Arkansas article, I append them again to this Article for the con-
venience of readers.108  Reading them demonstrates the public meaning 
of “commerce” far more effectively than would any comparable number 
of words from me. 
The surveys in my University of Chicago and Arkansas Law Review 
articles establish that, both inside and outside the process of drafting and 
ratifying the Constitution, the normal, conventional, and commonplace 
public meaning of commerce from 1728 to 1800 was “trade and ex-
change,” as well as transportation for this purpose.  The idea of “inter-
course” subsumes these activities within the concept of transporting per-
sons and things from one place to another.  On the strength of this data, I 
find it difficult to believe that the term “commerce” was even ambiguous 
in those days.  But if it was, the historical evidence clearly shows which of 
the two purported meanings was the normal public connotation of the 
word used in Article I, Section 8. 
III. AMBIGUITY 
All of this omitted evidence of semantic usage refutes Balkin’s claim 
that “[t]he Supreme Court adopted the distinctions between commerce, 
agriculture, and manufacturing in the early nineteenth century, in part to 
maintain distinctions between local and national power.”109  To the con-
trary, at the Founding, commerce was an activity that was distinct from 
the activities of agriculture and manufacturing.  Nor can the “trade theo-
ry” be dismissed as “a constitutional construction adopted in a particular 
historical context that limited the scope of ‘commerce’ in order to main-
tain an underlying structural principle.”110  This consistency of linguistic 
usage is simply too overwhelming to be anything other than evidence of 
the meaning of the word “commerce” itself in the relevant political and 
historical context. 
 
 107. Leonidas, The Subject of an American Navy Continued, PA. GAZETTE, July 31, 1782 (empha-
sis added), available at Accessible Archives, Item No. 67554. 
 108. See infra app. 1. 
 109. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 153–54. 
 110. Id. at 154. 
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What evidence Balkin presents does not establish a broader mean-
ing of “commerce” in the Constitution that subsumes the trade or trans-
portation of people and things from one place to another, but evidence 
that the word “commerce” had more than one sense.  In short, his is evi-
dence that the term “commerce” was ambiguous.  When confronted with 
ambiguity, an originalist attempts to identify which of the distinctive 
senses was the one conveyed by the passage in question given its con-
text.111  To the extent that the word “commerce” was ever used in com-
mon parlance to connote social interaction in general, was this the sense 
in which it was used in the commerce clause, or was “commerce” instead 
used in the commonplace sense of trading or transporting things from 
one place to another?  This is a mutually exclusive choice unless it is con-
tended that the writing would have been read as referring to both distinct 
but different meanings.   
Consider, for example, today’s meaning of “intercourse.”  The Ox-
ford English Dictionary begins with the etymology of “intercourse” in 
old French as “entrecours exchange, commerce,” and “entrecorre to run 
between.”112  It then offers these nine distinct senses of “intercourse”: 
1. Communication to and fro between countries, etc.; mutual 
dealings between the inhabitants of different localities.  In 
early use exclusively with reference to trade, and hence some-
times = commerce, traffic; now in more general sense. . . . 
2. a. Social communication between individuals; frequent and 
habitual contact in conversation and action; dealings. . . . 
 b. With of (= in respect of, as regards). . . . 
 c. pl. Now rare. . . . 
 d. Sexual conne[ct]ion. . . . 
3. Communion between man and that which is spiritual or  
unseen. . . . 
4. Communication of ideas; discourse, conversation, discussion.  
Obs. (exc. as included in 2). . . . 
5. a. Intercommunication between things or parts. . . . 
 b. A means or way of intercommunication. . . . 
6. Passage in; entrance.  Obs. . . . 
7. Continuous interchange or exchange of (letters, etc.).  Now 
rare. . . . 
 
 111. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional As-
sumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 631–37 (2009) (discussing how the resolution of ambiguity by in-
terpretation in the Constitution differs from the resolution of vagueness by construction).   
 112. 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1094 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 
1989). 
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8. Interchange of one thing with another; alternation.  Obs. . . . 
9. a. The fact of coming between or intervening; intervention; 
an intervening course or space; an interval.  Obs. . . . 
 b. Intervention on the part of some agent.113 
One immediately notices that the primary meaning of “intercourse” 
as “[c]ommunication to and fro between countries, etc.; mutual dealings 
between the inhabitants of different localities” and its “early use exclu-
sively with reference to trade, and hence sometimes = commerce, traffic” 
is distinct from its secondary sense of “[s]ocial communication between 
individuals; frequent and habitual contact in conversation and action; 
dealings” or “[s]exual conne[ct]ion.”  Someone who was employing the 
term “intercourse” today would ordinarily mean either the sense of 
“[c]ommunication to and fro between countries” or the sense of “[s]ocial 
communication between individuals.”  Unless they were being poetic, 
they would not mean both at the same time.  Someone conveying both 
meanings simultaneously would be engaged in something like a double 
entendre; but, even so, typically a single meaning is meant by a play on 
words.   
Balkin implicitly admits as much when he baldly asserts that “sexual 
intercourse . . . is not the concept referred to by the commerce clause.”114  
Yet “[s]exual conne[ct]ion” is a version of the second “social communi-
cation” sense of “intercourse.”  Balkin is right that it is inconceivable 
that in context, the commerce clause conveyed to a reasonable reader 
that Congress had power over sexual intercourse among the states.  But 
his entirely warranted assertion inadvertently undercuts his primary 
claim that Congress was given the power to regulate “social intercourse” 
of which sexual intercourse is a subset. 
Another unrecognized admission immediately follows Balkin’s 
claim that “[t]he interaction theory defines ‘commerce’ according to its 
broadest eighteenth-century meaning as ‘intercourse.’”115  In the next 
sentence, quoting Gibbons, he contends that “[t]he primary focus of the 
clause, as Chief Justice Marshall explained, is ‘commercial intercourse 
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches.’”116  But if 
“commerce” simply meant “intercourse,” as Balkin claims, then Mar-
shall’s use of “commercial intercourse” would be entirely redundant.  To 
the extent that “intercourse” has any broader meaning than “com-
merce,” Marshall’s use of the phrase “commercial intercourse” limits its 
scope to one species of intercourse: commerce. 
 
 113. Id. at 1094–95 (first emphasis added) (illustrations omitted). 
 114. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 150.  I say “baldly” because there is no support offered for this as-
sertion. 
 115. Id. at 155. 
 116. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824)). 
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So, to carry the day, it is simply not enough for Balkin to notice that 
“commerce” is defined as “intercourse,” and provide a few examples of 
each term having a “social interaction” connotation.  He must show that 
the distinctive “social interaction” sense was the one conveyed by the use 
of the term “commerce” in the commerce clause, which he has entirely 
failed to do.  And one can see why.  For had he shown that the public 
meaning of “commerce” was social intercourse, he would have been ex-
cluding from the Constitution the alternate distinctive meaning of 
“commerce” as the activity of trade in or the transportation of persons 
and things.  So it is unsurprising that such proof is unavailable.  
There is no intercourse clause in the Constitution, much less an in-
teraction clause.  Congress is given power over commerce, and not even 
all commerce at that: just that commerce that takes place between states, 
and between persons in the United States and those in foreign nations 
and the Indian tribes.117  As Justice Black cautioned, one must always be 
careful when substituting one word for another.118 
Still, when properly defined, the primary sense of “intercourse” is 
entirely consistent with the historical and traditional understanding of 
commerce as exchange, but also the transportation of things from one 
place to another on ships and by other means of conveyance.  And it is 
no stretch to include the interstate transmission of electricity or the elec-
tronic transmission of information between states within the original 
meaning of “commerce.”   
It was precisely for moments like this that I surveyed every use of 
the term “commerce” in the relevant sources, and I reported any exam-
ples that even came close to the line.  None of this evidence of contem-
porary usage is treated in Living Originalism.  Perhaps the most succinct 
way to summarize the evidence is this: Not one person in Philadelphia or 
the state ratification conventions is recorded as unambiguously using 
“commerce” in the broad sense of social interaction that Balkin contends 
that everyone would have understood was its meaning in the Constitu-
tion.  Neither did the authors of The Federalist, including nationalist Al-
exander Hamilton.  Conversely, examples are legion of persons distin-
guishing “commerce” from agriculture and manufacturing, a distinction 
that Balkin contends was invented as a constitutional construction some-
time in the nineteenth century.   
Of course, if I am mistaken and one, two, or ten such examples ex-
ist, this would still not establish “social interaction” as the dominant or 
objective meaning of “commerce” in context.  Such extrinsic evidence 
would only establish that the term “commerce” was ambiguous.  We 
would then have to assess which sense of “commerce” was conveyed by 
the commerce clause. 
 
 117. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 118. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE BEDFORD RESOLUTION 
In light of this evidence of semantic meaning, there is little reason to 
comprehensively discuss Balkin’s heavy reliance on Gunning Bedford’s 
Resolution VI in the Philadelphia convention that read (as amended): 
That the national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights 
vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover, to legislate 
in all cases for the general interests of the union, and also in those 
to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation.119 
Giving Congress power over commerce with foreign nations, among the 
several states, and with Indian tribes would have been, and still is, con-
sistent with this expression of principle.  That other activity over which 
Congress was not given power might one day fall within the “general in-
terests of the union” does not change the original meaning of “com-
merce” one whit.   
Nor would the adoption of this resolution by the secret Philadelphia 
convention expand the power of Congress under Article I, Section 8.  To 
the extent it was originally proposed to be incorporated into the text of 
the Constitution—which is surely how it reads—that idea was obviously 
rejected since it was not so incorporated.  That it might have provided 
guidance for the Committee of Detail did not enact its wording into law.  
Instead, the Committee set out to detail or enumerate powers that fit the 
description of objects of legislation serving the “general interests of the 
union” that states were “separately incompetent” to address.  The result 
was the list of powers expressed in the text of Article I, Section 8. 
Why might Bedford’s proposal have been replaced by specific enu-
meration?  This question is extensively addressed by Joseph Lynch in his 
1999 book, Negotiating the Constitution.120  Lynch contends that “Bedford 
intended, as all the delegates understood, that the general language he 
proposed be inserted into the text of the Constitution in just that 
form.”121  Lynch’s presentation of the records of the Convention supports 
the conclusion that, when Virginia thought that both houses of Congress 
would be allocated on the basis of population, its delegates supported 
broad federal powers.  But as soon as the Convention adopted equal rep-
resentation in the Senate, Virginia cooled on this aspect of the “Virginia 
Plan.”122 
 
 119. MADISON, supra note 56, at 380.  For a description of the drafting history that led to this lan-
guage, see BALKIN, supra note 2, at 143–46. 
 120. JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT (1999).  In Restoring the Lost Constitution, I relied upon and cited Lynch’s analysis 
in discussing the fate of the Bedford Resolution.  See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 274–76 (2004).   
 121. LYNCH, supra note 120, at 18.   
 122. See id. at 8–20. 
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“In the beginning, George Washington and James Madison were 
committed nationalists.”123  In his original proposal, now called the “Vir-
ginia Plan,” Madison proposed a bicameral legislature in which both 
houses were apportioned by population.124  At that time Virginia “had 
the largest number of both free persons and slaves,”125 so it would be very 
well represented in the new Congress.   
It was within that context that the Virginia Plan, contemplating a 
truly national government, boldly provided that the legislature, in 
addition to the powers granted to the Continental Congress under 
the Articles, would be authorized to pass laws “in all cases to which 
the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Leg-
islation.126 
After the Great Compromise, according to which the House would be 
elected by population but the several states would have equal representa-
tion in the Senate, Virginia’s position changed.  “After the compromise, 
the Virginia delegation abandoned the proposal for broad legislative 
powers and fought instead for the specific enumeration of congressional 
powers . . . .”127  On this matter, my own reading of the exchanges at the 
Convention on which Lynch relies supports his account.128 
After neglecting Lynch entirely in his earlier draft, Balkin has now 
added a lengthy endnote discussing my reliance upon Lynch in Restoring 
the Lost Constitution.129  But Balkin does not comment on Lynch’s claim 
that Bedford had proposed his language be included in the text “in just 
that form,” an idea that was obviously rejected by the Convention in the 
end, since that language does not appear in Article I.  Instead, Balkin fo-
cuses on Lynch’s contention that the spirit of the Bedford Resolution 
was preserved by the necessary and proper clause, which was deliberate-
ly left ambiguous so both sides would later be free to argue their mean-
ing had prevailed.130   
This claim by Lynch is irrelevant, however, to Balkin’s thesis that 
the commerce clause incorporated the Bedford Resolution by employing 
the word “commerce” in the sense of “social intercourse,” rather than 
trade.  Indeed, Balkin claims that Lynch is wrong to focus on the neces-
 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 9. 
 128. Lynch employs this narrative in service to his claim that the necessary and proper clause was 
deliberately ambiguous, so that each side of the debate over the scope of federal power could claim it 
supported its position.  See id. at 21 (“[F]or Virginia and the South the deliberate ambiguity of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause represented a substantial improvement over the Bedford resolution.”). 
 129. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 376–77 n.27. 
 130. Id.  I responded to this claim by Lynch in BARNETT, supra note 120, at 156–57.  Indeed, 
Balkin himself does not share Lynch’s reading of the necessary and proper clause.  See BALKIN, supra 
note 2, at 376–77 n.27 (“I do not agree in all respects with Lynch’s . . . view that the necessary and 
proper clause is the source of congressional power to legislate in the interests of the Union.”). 
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sary and proper clause because the original meaning of “commerce” did 
all the work of the original Virginia Plan and Bedford’s resolution.  
Whatever may have motivated the convention, however, Balkin never 
clearly confronts the semantic significance of shifting from Bedford’s 
broad statement of principle in a secret convention to the specific enu-
meration of powers, in particular the semantic meaning of the commerce 
clause.   
In his endnote discussing Lynch, Balkin says this is a matter of con-
stitutional construction.  “In my view, the principle of [the Bedford 
Resolution] underlies and should inform the proper construction of all of 
Congress’s enumerated powers.”131  But first comes interpretation, and 
then comes construction.  As Balkin well knows, an originalist must first 
determine the semantic meaning of the word “commerce,” and only then 
engage in construction where that meaning is vague.132  An originalist 
does not use “construction” to create an ambiguity by identifying a devi-
ant semantic sense of a term and then adopt the deviant sense because it 
best fits an underlying principle.   
 I do not deny that the powers specified in Article I, Section 8 at-
tempted to implement the principle articulated in the Bedford Resolu-
tion, although Balkin’s claim that James Wilson relied publicly on the 
Bedford Resolution when addressing the Pennsylvania ratification con-
vention133 has been disputed by Kurt Lash.134  But this change of wording 
communicated to the public a more specific commitment to granting only 
these powers, regardless of how changing circumstances might create a 
need for additional powers to be allocated to the national government.  
The commitment to enumerated powers was widely trumpeted and cru-
cial to the Constitution’s narrow adoption, and was the Federalists’ prin-
cipal response to the omission of a bill of rights in the original Constitu-
tion.135 
 So, regardless of whether the Bedford Resolution was ever “reject-
ed” by the secret convention in Philadelphia, the fact that its wording 
was never incorporated into the text of the Constitution entails that it did 
not become part of its public meaning.  From the standpoint of original 
meaning, all that matters is the original public meaning of each power 
 
 131. Balkin, supra note 2, at 377 n.27. 
 132. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 133. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 143 (quoting Wilson’s statement to the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention). 
 134. Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems 
Under Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2012) (manuscript at 33–34), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1894737 (explaining that Wilson was actually likely to be referring 
to a resolution by Roger Sherman that had been rejected by the Philadelphia convention). 
 135. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“[B]ills of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be dan-
gerous.  They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very 
account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.  For why declare that 
things shall not be done which there is no power to do?”). 
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that was specified in Article I, Section 8—including the original public 
meaning of “commerce” in the commerce clause.  To establish this mean-
ing, one looks not to secret resolutions, but to the evidence of original 
meaning arrayed above.136 
In a blog post responding to Kurt Lash’s powerful critique of his 
claim that Resolution VI informs the original public meaning of the 
commerce clause or necessary and proper clause, Balkin now maintains 
that he offered Resolution VI solely as a constitutional construction, or 
what he calls a “structural” argument: “[M]y argument about Resolution 
VI is . . . not . . . an argument about the original meaning of the words of 
the constitutional text.  That is because it is not a claim about original 
semantic meaning, reasonable implications to be drawn from original 
semantic meaning, or widely acknowledged terms of art.”137 
 This is a major concession by Balkin, and one that undermines how 
his originalist analysis of the commerce clause has already been used in 
important litigation.  In its amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on 
behalf of state legislators supporting the constitutionality of the individu-
al insurance mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
the Constitutional Accountability Center read Balkin, and Akhil Amar, 
as making a claim about original public meaning rather than constitu-
tional construction: “With respect to ‘commerce,’ the original meaning at 
the time of the Founding carried ‘a broader meaning referring to all 
forms of intercourse in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly eco-
nomic or mediated by explicit markets.’”138  But Balkin now expressly 
denies he is making any such claim about original meaning, at least with 
respect to his heavy reliance upon the Bedford Resolution, i.e., Resolu-
tion VI. 
As Lash rightly observes, however, “the principle of federal power 
supposedly represented by Resolution VI is only one of many possible 
principles or rules of construction that might be brought to bear in apply-
ing the text of Article I, Section 8 to a legal dispute.”139  The choice of 
“Resolution VI (whatever its meaning) over other possible rules of con-
struction requires a normative theory that justifies the use of Resolution 
VI.”140 
 
 136. See supra Part II. 
 137. Jack M. Balkin, Resolution VI As a Principle of Construction, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 12, 
2011, 5:55 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/08/resolution-vi-as-principle-of.html. 
 138. Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional Accountability Center in Support of Appellant and 
Reversal at 14, 14 n.5 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 
2011), 2011 WL 792217 at *14, *14 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005), and citing Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 44 (2010)). 
 139. Lash, supra note 134 (manuscript at 21). 
 140. Id.  Not that there is anything wrong with that.  The “presumption of liberty” I propose in 
Restoring the Lost Constitution is expressly defended as a principle of construction rather than as an 
interpretive claim about original meaning.  See BARNETT, supra note 120, at 268–69.  In contrast, the 
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Indeed, in the very passage of the speech quoted by Balkin, James 
Wilson himself offered his own repudiation of Balkin’s use of the Bed-
ford Resolution in constitutional construction.  “In order to lessen or re-
move the difficulty arising from discretionary construction on this sub-
ject,” said Wilson, “an enumeration of particular instances, in which the 
application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with 
much industry and care.”141  What Wilson is saying here is that, precisely 
to avoid resorting to constitutional construction, text with a more specific 
original meaning was selected to define the scope of Congress’s power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have identified the serious weakness with Jack 
Balkin’s “interaction theory” of “commerce.”  Balkin reduces “com-
merce” to “intercourse” and “intercourse” to “interaction” and “interac-
tion” to “affecting.”  The evidence presented on behalf of this triple re-
duction is very thin.  Nor does he offer much, if any, evidence of the 
public meaning of the crucial (for him) concept of “intercourse,” which 
some contemporary dictionaries circularly defined as “commerce.” 
Balkin relies more heavily on John Marshall’s definition of “com-
merce” as “intercourse” than he does on any other source.  And, as I 
have written, Marshall was unquestionably correct in his finding that 
navigation was included within the meaning of commerce.  My sources 
are overwhelmingly clear.  Defining “commerce” as a subset of “inter-
course”—as suggested by Marshall’s use of the phrase “commercial in-
tercourse”—resolves this question.  If the activity of engaging in com-
merce included the transportation of persons and things from one place 
to another, this would surely include transporting things on ships. 
While Balkin characterizes the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury Supreme Court’s distinction between commerce, manufacturing, and 
agriculture as a constitutional construction, he fails to acknowledge the 
substantial evidence that the general public in the eighteenth century 
commonly distinguished between commerce, manufacturing, and agricul-
ture.  In addition to evidence of usage found in the framing and ratifica-
tion debates, there is also a comprehensive survey of all the uses of the 
term “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette over a seventy-year peri-
 
original meaning of the Constitution does include the rules of construction provided by the Ninth and 
Eleventh Amendments.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
 141. Speech of James Wilson, as it appears in BALKIN, supra note 2, at 145–46 (emphasis added) 
(quoting 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 65, at 424–25).  It is worth noting that when historical fig-
ures use the term “construction,” they sometimes mean what is now called “interpretation” of the se-
mantic meaning of the text.  But more typically, they are referring to the method now labeled “con-
struction,” and Wilson’s use of the phrase “discretionary construction” signals that this is his meaning. 
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od.  This evidence indicates that the original meaning of “commerce”—
though broader than trade in goods—is narrower than all “social interac-
tion.”   
Commerce can mean a good deal more than trade—and the fact 
that it includes navigation is important evidence that it did—while mean-
ing a good deal less than interaction, which would subsume the economic 
activities of manufacturing and agriculture.  Indeed “intercourse” or 
“communication with” is consistent with the transportation of anything—
from goods, to people, to ships, to messages—from one place to another.  
Even in the sexual context, “intercourse” refers to the act of transmis-
sion, as distinct from other types of sexual “interactions.”  Intercourse, 
therefore, would not include the manufacturing of the items or the grow-
ing of crops that are then traded and transported from one place to an-
other.  
While Balkin approves of Chief Justice Marshall’s definition of 
“commerce” as “intercourse,” he then rejects Marshall’s treatment of in-
spection laws as not within the definition of the commerce power.  That 
move requires a lot more defense than merely labeling Marshall’s view 
“dicta”142 based on the lack of national economic integration (which, by 
the way, was anticipated at the time of the Founding143).  And the further 
move to reduce “intercourse” between or among the states to the New 
Deal’s “substantial effects” doctrine would then require much more de-
fense than it currently receives.  But I shall leave these matters to anoth-
er day. 
In discussing the Bedford Resolution, Balkin insists it was “adopt-
ed” and not rejected.  But he fails to consider the potential relevance of 
the switch to equal representation in the Senate on the attitude of the 
larger states towards sweeping allocations of power to the national gov-
ernment, and a subsequent insistence on enumerated powers.  Another 
way to put this is that, while the “principle” of the Bedford Resolution 
may never have been formally rejected, it was certainly not explicitly in-
cluded in the text (as Balkin acknowledges), and it is not clear what rele-
vance this literally secret-from-the-public intention had on the public 
meaning of “commerce among the several states”—especially in light of 
the protests expressed against the uncertainty of this principle even by 
delegates in the secret convention deliberations.   
  
 
 142. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 180. 
 143. See BARNETT, supra note 120, at 315. 
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Just as substituting other words for the words included in the text 
can be used to avoid rather than illuminate original meaning, so too can 
replacing what the text says with its allegedly “underlying principle”144 or 
swapping a broader dictionary meaning of a word with the more specific 
meaning that word would have had in context.  Even if he was wrong 
about the liberty protected in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Black well 
described how that game is played. 
  
 
 144. See Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 411–16 (2007) (crit-
icizing Balkin for making this move). 
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APPENDIX 1: 
TYPICAL USES OF THE TERM “COMMERCE” IN THE  
PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE (1731–1800)145 
 
1.  July 1, 1731 (#737): Upon the whole; if we permit the northern colo-
nies to continue their Commerce in the Way they are now in, the Nation 
in general will be benefited by it, because the French must pay (either in 
Money, or what will at last turn into Money) the whole Charge of the 
Shipping employ’d in it, and the Value of the Cargoes, which will add so 
much to the Balance of our Trade[.] 
 
2.  December 18, 1740 (#4275): This was the Time to have wrested Gi-
braltar out of British hands, to have deprived England of the Mediterra-
nean Trade, and made an advantageous Treaty of Commerce with his 
Catholick Majesty, whereby to have effectually tripped up the Heels of 
the English in their Trade to America likewise. 
 
3.  August 30, 1750 (#12025): Tho’ the “Accounts from Ohio mention 
that the French still continue their Threats against the Indians, who carry 
on Commerce with our Traders,” 
 
4.  August 23, 1753 (#15973): The great King GEORGE has, no Doubt, 
well considerof the most likely Method of establishing a Friendship be-
tween his Subjects the English in this Country and the Indians, and wise-
ly concluded, that the most likely Way to unite them, and to cement a 
Friendship betwixt them, would be by trade and Commerce; and as he 
knew that the Indians were a poor People, and had few or no Goods to 
give in Exchange for those Things they might want from the English, 
therefore it was agreed upon, that Skins should be the Commodity to be 
given in Exchange for what they might so want. 
 
5.  February 11, 1755 (#17919): We are told, by their Historians, that 
what principally induced the French to make Settlements on this Conti-
nent, was the Prospect of reaping vast Advantages from and extensive 
Commerce with the Natives of the Country; and it must the confessed, 
that they have so far succeeded in their Design, as to have engrosses, at 
this Time, almost the whole Trade to themselves, of which, a few Years 
since, we enjoyed no small Share. 
 
6.  March 3, 1757 (#20378): But as the Amendments proposed by your 
Honour for laying an Embargo generally on Provisions, intended to be 
exported to any of the Neutral Ports in Europe as well as America, if ac-
 
 145. This Appendix originally appeared in Barnett, supra note 97, at 868–99.  For a description of 
the Appendix’s creation, see supra note 98. 
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ceded to, will effectually prevent the Commerce carried on with several 
of the Neutral Ports in Europe, without which our Trade must be in a 
Manner destroyed, we cannot admit of them in the Bill. 
 
7.  March 27, 1760 (#24584): Our Government has settled a Treaty of 
Peace and Commerce with a Chief of the Indians of St. John River, and a 
Chief of the Pasamaquadie Tribe.  Large Quantities of Goods for that 
Trade are bought up, and shipped on board Capt. Cobb, who will sail in a 
Day or two with the above Indians for the River St. John. 
 
8.  November 7, 1765 (#37061): AT a general Meeting of the Merchants 
of the City of New York, trading to Great Britain, at the House of Mr. 
George Burns, of the said City, Innholder, to consider what was neces-
sary to be done in the present Situation of Affairs, with respect to the 
STAMP ACT, and the melancholy State of the north American Com-
merce, so greatly restricted by the Impositions and Duties established by 
the late Acts of Trade[.] 
 
9.  November 7, 1765 (#37069): THE Merchants and Traders of the City 
of Philadelphia, taking into their Consideration the melancholy State of 
the North American Commerce in general, and the distressed Situation 
of the Province of Pennsylvania in particular, do unanimously agree, 
THAT the many difficulties they now labour under as a Trading People, 
are owing to the Restrictions, Prohibitions, and ill advised Regulations, 
made in the several Acts of the Parliament of Great Britain, lately 
passed, to regulate the Colonies; which have limited the Exportation of 
some Part of our Country Produce, increased the Cost and Expence of 
many Articles of our Importation, and cut off from us all Means of sup-
plying ourselves with Specie enough even to pay the Duties imposed on 
us, much less to serve as a Medium of our Trade. 
 
10.  January 9, 1766 (#37260): He enforced his Observations, by expatiat-
ing on the Advantage which we should receive on a Submission to the 
Act, by carrying on an extensive Commerce, while our Rival Colonies on 
the Continent, by their Refusal of the Stamps, had entirely obstructed 
their own Trade[.] 
 
11.  August 7, 1766 (#38486): That we apprehend no Arguments can be 
necessary to prove, that Commerce cannot be carried on to any benefi-
cial Extent, without a proper Medium of circulating Cash, destitute of 
which, the Trade of this Colony must, in a short Time, be confined to the 
restricted Limits of Barter among ourselves, and the commercial Inter-
course with Great Britain be greatly diminished, to the manifest Loss of 
the Mother Country, and Impoverishment of the Colony. 
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12.  September 25, 1766 (#38825): The trade with the Indians, though car-
ried on in America, IS NOT AN AMERICAN INTEREST.  The people 
of America are chiefly farmers and planters; scarce any thing that they 
raise or produce is an article of commerce with the Indians. 
 
13.  October 23, 1766 (#39020): Had not a repeal of the stamp act (ac-
companied with prospect of the extension of trade) taken place, com-
merce must have ceased here, agriculture, manufacture, and economy, 
become the sole object of the attention and pursuit of those colonies. 
 
14.  December 10, 1767 (#41598): All before, are calculated to regulate 
trade, and preserve or promote a mutually beneficial intercourse be-
tween the several constituent parts of the empire; and though many of 
them imposed duties on trade, yet those duties were always imposed with 
design to restrain the commerce of one part, that was injurious to anoth-
er, and thus to promote the general welfare. 
 
15.  April 7, 1768 (#42248): In regulating the trade of the colonies, great 
attention ought to be exercised, and the consequences of such regula-
tions should be deliberately considered.  Rather than to violate the rights 
of the colonies, it is the interest of Great Britain, in her regulations of 
trade, to grant them the greatest indulgence; for commerce delights and 
flourishes in a free air; and the FARMER hath proved, that the flourish-
ing state of Great Britain, is owing to the trade she carries on with these 
colonies. 
 
16.  July 7, 1768 (#42773): The oppressive stamp act confessedly imposed 
internal taxes, and the late acts of parliament, giving and granting certain 
duties in the British colonies, plainly tend to the same point.  Duties have 
been imposed to restrain the commerce of one part of the Empire that 
was likely to prove injurious to another, and by this means the welfare of 
the whole promoted; but duties imposed on such of the British exports as 
are necessaries of life, to be paid by the colonists on importation, without 
any view to the interests of commerce, but merely to raise a revenue, or 
in other words to compel the colonists to part with their money against 
their inclinations, they conceive to be a tax internal to all intents and 
purposes.  And can it be thought just or reasonable, restricted as they are 
in their trade, confined as they are in their exports, obliged to purchase 
these very necessaries at the British market, that they should now be told 
they shall not have them without paying a duty for them? 
 
17.  July 28, 1768 (#42935): To this Gentleman, you must attribute the 
Loss of your Reputation: and it was, certainly, your Misfortune, and the 
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Misfortune of all America, that you did not know him, as well as he knew 
you,—He imposed Duties upon Paper, Glass, and Painters Colours; Ar-
ticles of Commerce, which will prove most grevious Taxes upon the 
Country in general; but cannot affect you as merchants: For it is notori-
ous, that a Merchant must have his Profit on every Article of his Trade, 
let the Original Cost be what it may[.] 
 
18.  June 1, 1769 (#44735): Therefore, in Justice to ourselves and our Pos-
terity, as well as to the Traders of Great Britain concerned in the Ameri-
can Commerce, we, the Subscribers, have voluntarily and unanimously 
entered into the following Resolutions, 
 
19.  June 28, 1770 (#46916): 5. RESOLVED, That it appears to this 
Meeting, that the Merchants of Newport, in Rhode Island, have been 
guilty of violating the Non-importation Agreement; and consequently 
have acted as Enemies to the Liberties of North America; and that, for 
the future, we will have no Commerce or Dealings with them, until they 
do return to a strict Adherence to their solemn Agreement of 
Non-importation. 
 
20.  December 12, 1771 (#50149): A Rev. Divine, in his sermon last Sab-
bath, speaking of the clause in the late proclamation, relating to our re-
turning thanks to God for the encrease of our commerce, said, that as to 
trade in general he did not pretend to know a great deal about it, but this 
he knew, that unless it was like a plant that grew more from pressing, it 
was in a very poor condition. 
 
21.  February 6, 1772 (#50425): and not the Importations of our own 
Merchants; who, in all sound Policy, and well regulated Commerce, 
ought to have a Preference in the Benefits arising from our Trade, 
 
22.  June 29, 1774 (#55632): By shutting up the port of Boston, some im-
agine that the course of trade might be turned hither, and to our benefit; 
but nature, in the formation of our harbour, forbids our becoming rivals 
in commerce with that convenient mart. 
 
23.  April 26, 1775 (#57516): That an imposition of duties upon articles of 
commerce imported from Great Britain, is oppressive and impolitic, as it 
gives the greatest encouragement to illicit trade, and operates as a prohi-
bition on our commerce with the mother county, which for the mutual 
advantage of both, we conceive, ought to be free and unrestrained. 
 
24.  September 18, 1776 (#60033): To remove all future suspicions from 
the minds of the Colonists, that under the appearance of regulating 
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commerce, duties may be imposed for the farther purposes of revenue, 
an application of the produce of all duties, imposed on articles of trade 
by the British legislation, shall b [sic] made towards defraying the 
expences of collection, and the surpluses in each colony to be paid into 
their separate treasuries, and to be subject to the disposal of the respec-
tive houses of Assembly. 
 
25.  March 21, 1778 (#61739): The act for prohibiting vendues not having 
had the intended effect, but the evil so justly complained of daily increas-
ing, it appears necessary to make trial of some other remedy; and as a 
plentiful supply of goods is the surest way of reducing the price of them, I 
submit to your judgment, whether it may not be expedient to establish a 
Board of Commerce, for importing such merchandize as may be wanted 
for the Indian trade, and other public services, and for accommodating 
the inhabitants of this State who are in low or middling circumstances, 
with the articles most requiste for their own consumption at reasonable 
rates. 
 
26.  February 3, 1779 (#64122): Instead of their affections, she has pro-
voked their utmost hatred; and instead of monopolizing their whole 
commerce (that commerce which yielded her a clear profit of two mil-
lions per ann. and which carried her triumphantly through the last war) 
she no longer retains the smallest share of it; nor can she even protect the 
trade of her own island.  Both the arms and the commerce of America, 
which were the principal supports of Britain, are now employed against 
her. 
 
27.  June 9, 1779 (#64475): The merchant, in the connection of the old 
trade with Britain, will cast a look wishfully upon the ocean, and will de-
sire too anxiously a restoration of peace and of commerce, in the old 
channel of a close and intimate connection with her island. 
 
28.  June 30, 1779 (#64537): Will it not be wise therefore in the Congress 
of these States, in whose power it is to regulate our commerce, to divert, 
by every regulation, the current of our trade as much as possible from 
Britain to other ports in the trading European countries?  It will not be 
necessary to restrain exportation; for it is our interest how much of our 
commodities are taken from us by any nation.  Nor will I undertake to 
say what duties shall be laid upon articles imported from the shores of 
Britain in order to restrain that importation; but I am clear and decided 
in my judgment, that it will be wise in the inhabitants of this country to 
reprobate every idea of an alliance with that people. 
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29.  April 4, 1781 (#66070): The Dutch commerce in Europe and the 
West Indies hath already suffered very much.  Many of their seamen are 
in the hands of the enemy: and it is highly probable that they will soon 
lose much of their trade and some of their most valuable settlements in 
the East Indies. 
 
30.  April 16, 1783 (#68488): By the definitive treaty, all those which have 
existed till now between the two High Contracting Parties, and which 
shall not have been derogated from either by the said Treaty or by the 
present Preliminary Treaty, shall be renewed and confirmed; and the two 
Courts shall name Commissioners to enquire into the state of commerce 
between the two nations, in order to agree upon new arrangements of 
trade, on the footing of reciprocity and mutual convenience.—The said 
two Courts shall together amicably fix a competent term for the duration 
of that business. 
 
31.  May 7, 1783 (#68568): Therefore, for the purpose of making a tem-
porary regulation of commerce and intercourse between Great Britain 
and America, and in order to evince the disposition of Great Britain to 
be on terms of the most perfect amity with America, and in confidence of 
a like friendly disposition on the part of the said states towards Great 
Britain, it further enacts, that after (a time to be named in the bill) the 
ships and vessels of the subjects of America, with the merchandises on 
board the same, shall be admitted into all the ports of Great Britain in 
the same manner as vessels of the subjects of other independent states; 
but the merchandize and goods on board such vessels, being of the pro-
duce of the said states, shall be liable to the same duties only, as the mer-
chandizes would be subject to, if they were the property of British sub-
jects, and imported in British built vessels. 
 
32.  October 8, 1783 (#69240): With respect to France, a nation that has 
so essentially supported our independence, has given us every pledge of 
friendship, and whose interest it is, as a rival of Britain, to cultivate a 
commerce with us as far as possible, the difficulties attending a free trade 
from America to her islands are still stronger. 
 
33.  December 17, 1783 (#69527): What is this more or less than to tell us, 
that while we have no National System of Commerce, the British will 
govern our trade by their own Laws and Proclamations as they please. 
 
34.  March 24, 1784 (#69901): That as this town is most advantageously 
situated for commerce, having a spacious and safe harbour, surrounded 
by a very extensive and fertile country, which is inhabited by an industri-
ous and enterprizing people, fully sensible of the advantages of trade; 
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and as the relative and essential importance and consequence of this 
state depend on the prosperity and extent of its agriculture and com-
merce, neither of which can alone render it important and happy, we are 
of opinion that in point of real honour and permanent utility, the meas-
ure proposed will be highly expedient. 
 
35.  June 2, 1784 (#70215): It will certainly be admitted, that Congress 
must be vested with powers competent to the protection of commerce, or 
the United States can never command reciprocal advantages in trade; 
and unless they are regarded by foreign powers as an entire, united na-
tion, conducting their commerce jointly and fairly, on principles of exact 
reciprocity with all nations, I fear Great Britain will not be led to make 
extensive concessions[.] 
 
36.  August 18, 1784 (#70510): Tuesday, the 23d ult. a meeting of gentle-
men deputed by several towns in New Jersey, was held at New Bruns-
wick, for the purpose of encouraging commerce.—They agreed to peti-
tion the Legislature, who are now sitting, to impose duties on all foreign 
products and manufactures imported into that state, and to establish free 
ports, with liberal charters. 
 
37.  November 17, 1784 (#70876): It were therefore to be wished, that 
commerce were as free between all the nations of the world, as it is be-
tween the several counties of England; so would all, by mutual communi-
cation, obtain more enjoyments.  Those counties do not ruin each other 
by trade, neither would the nations.  No nation was ever ruined by trade, 
even, seemingly, the most disadvantageous. 
 
38.  June 22, 1785 (#71708): Resolved, That reciprocity of advantages and 
benefits in trade, ought to be secured, by treaties of commerce between 
the citizens of the United States and the subjects of those powers with 
whom they have commercial intercourse, so as to render our commerce 
with other nations beneficial to our country. 
 
39.  January 18, 1786 (#72428): To hear a London-trader, who in two 
years accumulated more wealth by his infernal commerce with the ene-
my, and furnishing them with materials to continue their unnatural war 
against his bleeding country, than he could in ten by his honest indus-
try[.] 
 
40.  April 19, 1786 (#72720): The Mediterranean trade shut to America 
by the depredations of the Barbary corsairs—the French and British 
West India islands refuse admittance to American vessels but in a very 
limited way—to what quarter of the world can she export her wheat, 
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corn and lumber—to whom and where can her citizens look for some 
participation of the commerce of the world[.] 
 
41.  April 26, 1786 (#72737): From the foregoing account, we can form a 
full idea of the resentment which still influences the politics of Britain 
against this country—America, however, has only to pursue a proper sys-
tem of commerce by prohibiting all British vessels from carrying supplies 
to the English islands; which method, if steadily pursued on our part, to-
gether with their own ill-judged policy, will reduce the West Indies to 
such distress as finally to force the haughty nation of Britain to a com-
mercial treaty, greatly advantageous to this country. 
 
42.  May 17, 1786 (#72824): By recent letters from Spain we hear, that the 
account of the cession of the Floridas to France is premature; but that 
there was great reason to believe that something of the kind would take 
place between England and Spain, in exchange for the fortress of Gibral-
tar, which would besides be followed by a very favorable treaty of com-
merce.  Should it take place it may prove of a very alarming nature to the 
United States, both as neighbours and as rivals in several important 
branches of trade. 
 
43.  July 19, 1786 (#73000): But further—Our trade was formerly carried 
on with men of our own country, and who spoke our own language.  But 
now we trade with men of all countries and languages.  It is incumbent 
upon us therefore to use a currency in our commerce with them which 
speaks a language that is alike intelligible in all countries. 
 
44.  July 26, 1786 (#73027): He began by declaring, that the measures 
pursued last year in respect to the West Indies had proved, that under 
due regulations our commerce with that quarter of the world had grown 
and encreased considerably, since the separation between Great Britain 
and the United States of America, and there was every reason to believe 
our Newfoundland trade and fishery, when properly conducted, would 
prove equally successful. 
 
45.  August 2, 1786 (#73047): No relaxation of the regulations prohibiting 
the importation of flour into Portugal could be obtained—the condition 
of that branch of our commerce remains under the treaty as it formerly 
was—the trade with Portugal has always been a favorable one to this 
country; with Portugal and Spain the balance has been, as I wish it was 
with all foreign nations, in our favor. 
 
46.  August 16, 1786 (#73099): Sufficient pains (says a correspondent) are 
not taken to distinguish between the distresses of the COMMERCE, and 
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the distress of the MERCHANTS of the United States.  While the pro-
duce and manufactures of our country command ready money, and a 
high price, our commerce cannot be said to be distressed, although it be 
carried on by foreign merchants, and in foreign bottoms. 
 
47.  August 16, 1786 (#73099): If it should be said, that in all communities 
there are persons who possess a genius for navigation and a naval life, 
and that this genius cannot be employed while the nations of Europe ex-
port our produce, it may be answered, that the commerce which necessity 
or habit made necessary between the different states, will always afford 
sufficient employment and encouragement for that proportion of our 
youth who may be supposed to prefer a life at sea to the occupations of 
agriculture or the mechanical arts. 
 
48.  December 20, 1786 (#73493): That such a currency can answer nei-
ther the purpose of carrying on trade, or of discharging our foreign debt; 
the consequence must be, either this state will be deprived of its com-
merce or drained of its specie, while no subject can have the least mo-
tives to import any. 
 
49.  March 7, 1787 (#73694): The commerce and traffic of the Back Coun-
try members and the parts they represent goes to Baltimore.  From 
thence are their imports purchased and there do their exports go.  They 
come here to legislate and go there to trade.  In questions of commerce, 
and by commerce I mean the exports as well as the imports of a country, 
they are neither naturally nor politically interested with us, and the deli-
cacy of the case when matters of this kind are agitated should have with 
them a greater weight. 
 
50.  June 13, 1787 (#73981): The duties and restrictions which one state 
imposes, the neighbouring states enable the merchants to elude; and be-
sides, if they could be inforced, it would be highly unjust, that the duties 
collected in the ports of one state should be applied to the sole use of 
that state in which they are collected, whilst the neighbouring states, who 
have no ports for foreign commerce, consume a part of the goods im-
ported, and thus in effect pay a part of the duties. 
 
51.  July 11, 1787 (#74035): When Congress have plenary power to sup-
port the national faith and honor, by wise measures to do justice to for-
eign and domestic creditors, to regulate trade and not be counteracted by 
any partial adjustments of particular states, then commerce will flourish; 
all nations will seek to trade with us, we shall have a ready market, and a 
good price, for whatever we have to part with.  Articles for exportation 
will increase rapidly. 
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52.  March 5, 1788 (#74659): While we rejoice in the step which has been 
taken by the convention to put a total stop to the commerce and slavery 
of the negroes one and twenty years hence, it is to be hoped the publica-
tion of the memorial may have some weight with individual states, to 
pass laws to prohibit that inhuman traffic, before the power of Congress 
over that part of the commerce of the states shall take place. 
 
53.  April 2, 1788 (#74741): Instead of which, you wish us to continue to 
view, with unavailing sorrow, the commerce of our country the devoted 
means of enriching foreign nations, whose partial restrictions have ex-
cluded us from enjoying any participation of their trade, in return. 
 
54.  April 30, 1788 (#74819): Tho’ the late arret of his Most Christian 
Majesty is exceedingly favorable to the commerce of the United States, 
particularly in putting us on a footing with his own subjects in all the 
ports of India belonging to his crown, yet the same difficulty stands in the 
way of more important advantages.  In short, commerce, whereby we are 
to vend the surplus of our produce to foreign nations is circumscribed 
and suspended, by our standing in the light of separate commonwealths, 
instead of ONE CONFEDERATED REPUBLIC. 
 
55.  July 9, 1788 (#74990): The subsistence of man, the materials of manu-
factures, the articles of commerce—all spring originally from the soil.  On 
agriculture, therefore, the wealth of nations is founded. 
 
56.  July 23, 1788 (#75008): Rank for a while forgot all its claims, and Ag-
riculture, Commerce and Manufactures, together with the learned and 
mechanical Professions, seemed to acknowledge, by their harmony and 
respect for each other, that they were all necessary to each other, and all 
useful in cultivated society. 
 
57.  August 6, 1788 (#75038): The Hanseatic league was the greatest, the 
most curious, regular and wise combination for the promotion of com-
merce that the world has ever beheld.  While the cities engaged in it ob-
tained all the benefits of domestic and foreign trade, for which they asso-
ciated, they afforded an happy assylum for religious and civil liberty, and 
became the masters of the ocean. 
 
58.  August 13, 1788 (#75054): Agriculture will no longer languish under 
the oppression of direct taxation—the rising government will be its tute-
lary God—our rivers will once more be whitened by the canvass of com-
merce—our manufactures will be encouraged and our coffers, as a na-
tion, enriched by wise and general duties. 
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59.  January 7, 1789 (#75465): Because some of the southern states have 
been seriously alarmed at those parts of the constitution, which cloathe a 
majority of the legislature with the power of regulating commerce, which 
may tend to confine and monopolize the carrying trade—as well as with 
the power of establishing duties on foreign imports, which, under the 
specious and seducing plea of encouraging domestic manufactures, may 
be carried to so injurious an extreme, as to operate as a prohibition[.] 
 
60.  July 1, 1789 (#75890): This would include to establish an office of 
treasury—to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and with Indian 
tribes.  This comprehended a power of erecting a board of trade, &c. and 
in order to carry these powers into execution, they were to make all laws 
necessary to carry the constitution into effect. 
 
61.  December 16, 1789 (#76325): You have wisely banished your paper 
tender.  Commerce, foreign and domestic, sickens at the sight of it.  Since 
the foederal constitution has removed all danger of our having a paper 
tender, our trade is advanced fifty per cent. 
 
62.  January 6, 1790 (#76370): An enlightened planter is a friend to manu-
facturers, by which his raw materials are prepared for the use of man—
he is a friend to commerce, which converts the surplus of his perishable 
produce into permanent wealth[.] 
 
63.  February 3, 1790 (#76452): An import in commerce is an article of 
goods brought from a foreign country, either by land or water, chiefly by 
water. 
 
64.  March 10, 1790 (#76574): Nothing can more pleasing evince the pro-
gress of agriculture and commerce in these states than the following 
facts.  The export of flour from Philadelphia in 1786 was 150,000 barrels; 
in 1787 it was 202,000 barrels; in 1788 it was 220,000 barrels; and in 1789 
it was 369,000 barrels. 
 
65.  May 5, 1790 (#76683): ALTHOUGH, at first view, the preceeding 
interpretation of the London Custom House, may seem chiefly to affect 
British vessels, by whom foreign produce could only be shipped from this 
country; yet a more minute examination must convince us, that the 
American commerce is thereby materially injured. 
 
66.  July 13, 1791 (#77685): That the solemn declarations of these gentle-
men, and of Matthew Montague and William Smith, Esquires, that they 
will not relinquish but with life their Struggle for the abolition of the 
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slave trade, are not only highly honorable to themselves as Britons, as 
statesmen, as Christians, but must eventually, as the light of evidence 
shall be more and more diffused, be seconded by the good wishes of eve-
ry man not immediately interested in the continuance of that detestable 
commerce. 
 
67.  November 2, 1791 (#77910): We are in high spirits on the subject of 
the grand manufactory, the establishment of which is meditated in this 
state.  Certain it is, that in a territory like our's (deprived as we are of the 
advantages of external commerce) agriculture and manufactures ought to 
be the main objects of our pursuit. 
 
68.  April 18, 1792 (#78231): The effect of this appears to me so exten-
sive, as to induce a doubt, whether I understand rightly the determina-
tion to enforce it, which you notify, and to oblige me to ask of you, 
whether we are to consider it as so far a revocation of the proclamation 
of your government, regulating the commerce between the two countries, 
and that henceforth no articles of the growth, production or manufacture 
of the United States, are to be received in the ports of Great Britain or 
Ireland, in vessels belonging to the citizens of the United States? 
 
69.  June 27, 1792 (#78353): The National Assembly of France have de-
termined to adopt the general principle of the abolition of the slave 
trade; that is, they have resolved to proceed in exact conformity with 
other nations in effecting a complete abolition of so infamous an abuse of 
commerce. 
 
70.  September 12, 1792 (#78495): But to return to the New Jersey manu-
factory; It appeared prudent to take a position in that state for the pur-
pose of interesting New York and Philadelphia, and as New Jersey has 
very little foreign commerce, it was presumed that both her legislature 
and her citizens would promote so valuable a branch of internal trade. 
 
71.  September 4, 1793 (#79199): Upon enquiring, however, more par-
ticularly into the facts, the Master Warden reported, that the ship came 
hither to take in a cargo for the island of Jamaica; and it appearing that 
her equipments and commission were intended for protection, in a 
course of commerce, and not for offensive war, I did not conceive that 
the case was comprehended within the provisions of the treaty[.] 
 
72.  December 24, 1793 (#79344): The ship Jane is an English merchant 
vessel, which has been many years employed in the commerce between 
Jamaica and these states.  She brought here a cargo of produce from that 
island, and was to take away a cargo of flour. 
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73.  December 24, 1793 (#79344): The occupation of a privateer is attack 
and plunder, that of a merchant vessel is commerce and 
self-preservation.  The article excludes the former from our ports, and 
from selling what she has taken, that is, what she has acquired by war, to 
shew it did not mean the merchant-vessel and what she had acquired by 
commerce.  Were the merchant-vessels, coming for our produce, forbid-
den to have any arms for their defence, every adventurer who has a boat, 
or money enough to buy one, would make her a privateer; our Coasts 
would swarm with them, foreign vessels must cease to come, our com-
merce must be suppressed, our produce remain on our hands, or at least 
that great portion of it, which we have not vessels to carry away, our 
ploughs must be laid aside, and agriculture suspended. 
 
74.  March 19, 1794 (#79538): To this list of grievances, the committee are 
sorry to find it their duty to add, that by reason of the vexation, loss, and 
outrages, suffered by the merchants of the United States, its commerce 
already begins to languish, and its products are likely to be left upon the 
hands of those who raise them. 
 
75.  April 1, 1795 (#80354): There are other things that attend this trade, 
that should not pass unnoticed: The Danes, or rather Dutch, under Dan-
ish colours, are powerful and jealous competitors for a share in this 
commerce: Their flags being also neutral, they swarm here from St. 
Thomas’s, &c.—and so far as relates to dry goods and groceries, endeav-
our to undersell us. 
 
76.  June 10, 1795 (#80477): When the account of the exports was given, it 
was stated that the exports of 1793 were less by four millions than in 
1792; but that in 1794 the exports exceeded those of 1793 two millions.  
To lose in one year two ninths of all our export trade must strike at the 
root of our commerce; and though this decrease was lessened afterwards, 
I appeal to gentlemen, whether this circumstance was not occasioned by 
the temporary possession of the West Indies, and by many sanguine 
speculations. 
 
77.  July 1, 1795 (#80519): Free commerce shall be allowed to British sub-
jects in any part of the United States, and vice versa, subject only to the 
general laws of trade. 
 
78.  July 8, 1795 (#80532): And in like manner all goods and merchan-
dize, whose importation into the United States shall not be wholly pro-
hibited, may freely, for the purposes of Commerce, be carried into the 
same, in the manner aforesaid, by his Majesty's subjects, and such goods 
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and merchandize shall be subject to no higher or other duties than would 
be payable by the citizens of the United States on the importation of the 
same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said States. 
 
79.  September 16, 1795 (#80633): Proximity of territory invites to trade; 
the bordering inhabitants, in spite of every prohibition, will endeavour to 
carry it on; if not allowed, illicit adventurers take place of the regular op-
erations of legal commerce; individual interest leads to collusions, to 
evade restraining regulations; habits of infracting the laws are produced; 
morals are perverted; securities necessarily great, in proportion as they 
counteract the natural course of things, lay the foundation of discontents 
and quarrels. 
 
80.  September 23, 1795 (#80650): The goods and merchandize, for the 
privileged importation of which it provides, are restricted to no particular 
object, have no special reference to Indian more than to other trade: On 
the contrary, they are expressly to be imported for “the purposes of 
commerce” at large; so that in the cases in which they are privileged, they 
are equally so, whether it be for a trade with our citizens, or with Indians. 
 
81.  September 23, 1795 (#80650): The same objection of superiority of 
capital may, with as much reason, be applied to any other branch of trade 
between us and Great Britain.  Why does it not give her a monopoly of 
the direct trade between her European dominions and the United 
States?  The argument, if valid, would prove that we ought to have no 
commerce, not only with Great Britain, but with any nation which has 
more commercial capital than ourselves. 
 
82.  September 30, 1795 (#80663): The product of all this trade, he says, 
must go down the Missisippi [Mississippi], and but for the stipulation of 
the third article, would have been exclusively ours; because “by the trea-
ty of Paris, though the British might navigate the Missisippi [Mississippi], 
yet they did not own a foot of land upon either of its banks; whereas the 
United States possessing all the Indian country in the vicinity of that riv-
er and the East bank, for many hundred miles, could, when they pleased, 
establish factories and monopolize that commerce.” 
 
83.  September 30, 1795 (#80663): The more we can make our country 
the ENTREPOT, the EMPORIUM of the trade of foreigners, the more 
we shall profit.  There is no commercial principle more obvious than this, 
more universally agreed, or more generally practised upon, in countries 
where commerce is well understood. 
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84.  September 30, 1795 (#80663): The pretended inequality of the article 
as arising from greater extent of the United States than of the British ter-
ritories, is one of those fanciful positions which are so apt to haunt the 
brains of visionary politicians.  Traced through all its consequences, it 
would terminate in this, that a great empire could never form a treaty of 
commerce with a small one; for to equalize advantages according to the 
scale of territory, the small state must compensate for its deficiency in ex-
tent, by a greater quantum of positive privilege, in proportion to the dif-
ference of extent, which would give the largest state the monopoly of its 
trade. 
 
85.  March 9, 1796 (#81010): May all sea-robbers, who prey upon the 
commerce and navigation of the United States be indiscriminately 
ingulfed in the whirlpool of destruction. 
 
86.  March 16, 1796 (#81027): The French treaty with Spain has given the 
republic free commerce to the Spanish ports; from which there are daily 
opportunities of annoying the British Mediterranean trade. 
 
87.  March 23, 1796 (#81046): the Mississippi, New Orleans, and the In-
dies will be shut against us; and instead of compensation for the past in-
juries to our trade, the spoliations will be renewed and aggravated, and 
that which is now sought by commerce, will be taken by robbery. 
 
88.  January 25, 1797 (#81638): That common interest has a peculiar rela-
tion to commerce, on the freedom and extension of which the public rev-
enue and the general prosperity of our country chiefly depend.  Will it 
then be believed that the government wished this commerce to be re-
strained, particularly the commerce in meals, which compose the most 
valuable part of our exports?  Especially will it be believed that the gov-
ernment desired that our citizens might have commerce only with Eng-
land? 
 
89.  November 29, 1797 (#82086): Their cities have been formed and exist 
upon commerce.  Our agriculture, fisheries, arts and manufactures are 
connected with and depend upon it.  In short, commerce has made this 
country what it is[.] 
 
90.  December 13, 1797 (#82114): The command of the Mediterranean 
trade, with all the naval force of Italy, if required, will enable France to 
make some figure on the water, and repair, in a degree, the loss of the 
Atlantic commerce. 
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91.  February 28, 1798 (#82243): To shew how deceitful and how weak 
this pretended obligation to deny ourselves the benefits of an equal trade 
with England is, let us look at the conduct of France herself.  First, the 
republic has decreed a navigation act, as hard upon American trade as 
that of Britain.  Secondly, she required an enormous duty on tobacco im-
ported in American bottoms, from which French ships were exempted.  
Thirdly, she has shut her islands against the most lucrative part of our 
commerce.  Molasses and taffia, a very bad kind of rum, being all that 
her permanent peace regulations will allow us to bring away; and there is 
little besides lumber, that we are allowed to carry to her islands; our fish 
was by heavy duties almost prohibited; flour she sent out from France.  
The war at present suspends these prohibitions, but peace will renew 
them. 
 
92.  December 12, 1798 (#82560): that contagious sickness may be com-
municated through the channels of commerce, there seems to be a neces-
sity that Congress, who alone can regulate trade, should frame a system, 
which, while it may tend to preserve the general health, may be compati-
ble with the interests of commerce, and the safety of the revenue. 
 
93.  February 6, 1799 (#82649): Affairs in this island, seem to bear a very 
serious aspect at present.  The brigands are determined to massacre all 
the whites, and offered a free and unmolested commerce on their part, to 
all nations that will trade with them. 
 
94.  May 8, 1799 (#82786): The grand nation are making at present more 
havoc among the American ships, than they have ever yet done; and un-
less the American government can give their commerce some protection 
to Europe, there will scarcely be a ship let to bring the produce to mar-
ket.  I am very certain, that these last ten days the privateers out of 
France have captured ten millions of dollars, bona fide American proper-
ty, bound to different ports in Europe. 
 
95.  June 12, 1799 (#82830): That with the forces of that country France 
would irrecoverably destroy the trade of England; and, by means of her 
navy, soon command the Baltic; and that, an intimate union between 
France and Holland being once formed, the supremacy of the English 
trade both in the East and West Indies would rapidly disappear.—Where 
are now those navies that were to usurp the empire of the sea, and 
controul the commerce of the world! 
 
96.  July 10, 1799 (#82870): It is expected that permission will be granted 
to vessels, which shall have made report at one of the ports of entry be-
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fore mentioned, to proceed, for purposes of commerce, to any other 
ports within the district aforesaid. 
 
97.  January 8, 1800 (#83038): The agency of the Executive Directory, 
considering that by the first article of the 14th Thermidor, year 7, to facil-
itate the commerce of St. Domingo, different objects of importation were 
summarily mentioned as free, and that by the 12th article all other mer-
chandize were obliged to pay 12 and an half per cent. 
 
98.  May 28, 1800 (#83261): A communication having been made by the 
Minister of His Britannic Majesty to the Department of State, that in 
consequence of complaints made by sundry merchants of the city of 
London, to their government, that the citizens of the United States have 
opened and are carrying on a trade to the British settlements in the Bay 
of Honduras, his Britannic Majesty “has resolved, that as such a com-
merce was contrary to the laws of England, all but British subjects in 
British ships navigated according to law, shall be excluded from cutting 
log-wood, or trading to those settlements in time to come”—it has been 
deemed proper, for the information of the citizens of the United States, 
that the same should be published. 
 
99.  June 11, 1800 (#83271): Whilst a great part of Europe is involved in a 
most sanguinary and calamitous war, the people of this country are fa-
voured with internal peace, and are at liberty to make improvements in 
agriculture, and advance toward perfection in the useful arts; but as the 
nations with whom we are most concerned in commerce are parties in 
the war, the United States have not been able to maintain her neutral 
character, without experiencing frequent and vexatious interruptions to 
their trade, by infractions of the law of nations. 
 
100.  June 18, 1800 (#83281): Invited by these resources, their extensive 
sea coast and their characteristic enterprise, to embark largely in a com-
merce rendered doubly profitable by their neutrality, the United States 
have experienced frequent interruptions to their trade by unprovoked 
infractions of the law of nations. 
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